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We study the randomness complexity of interactive proofs and zero-knowledge proofs. In particular,
we ask whether it is possible to reduce the randomness complexity, R, of the verifier to be comparable
with the number of bits, CV , that the verifier sends during the interaction. We show that such
randomness sparsification is possible in several settings. Specifically, unconditional sparsification
can be obtained in the non-uniform setting (where the verifier is modelled as a circuit), and in
the uniform setting where the parties have access to a (reusable) common-random-string (CRS).
We further show that constant-round uniform protocols can be sparsified without a CRS under a
plausible worst-case complexity-theoretic assumption that was used previously in the context of
derandomization.
All the above sparsification results preserve statistical-zero knowledge provided that this property
holds against a cheating verifier. We further show that randomness sparsification can be applied
to honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge (HVSZK) proofs at the expense of increasing the
communication from the prover by R − F bits, or, in the case of honest-verifier perfect zero-
knowledge (HVPZK) by slowing down the simulation by a factor of 2R−F . Here F is a new measure
of accessible bit complexity of an HVZK proof system that ranges from 0 to R, where a maximal
grade of R is achieved when zero-knowledge holds against a “semi-malicious” verifier that maliciously
selects its random tape and then plays honestly. Consequently, we show that some classical HVSZK
proof systems, like the one for the complete Statistical-Distance problem (Sahai and Vadhan, JACM
2003) admit randomness sparsification with no penalty.
Along the way we introduce new notions of pseudorandomness against interactive proof systems,
and study their relations to existing notions of pseudorandomness.
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1 Introduction
Randomness is a valuable resource. It allows us to speed-up computation in various settings
and it is especially useful, or even essential, at the presence of adversarial behavior. Con-
sequently, an extensive body of research has been devoted to the question of minimizing
the randomness complexity in various contexts. Notably, the seminal notion of pseudoran-
domness [8, 41] has been developed as a universal approach for saving randomness or even
completely removing the need for random bits. In this paper, we study this general question
in the context of (probabilistic) interactive proofs.
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Interactive proofs, presented by [24, 4], form a natural extension of non-deterministic
polynomial time computation (NP). A computationally-bounded probabilistic verifier V
wishes to decide whether an input x is a member of a promise problem1 Π = (Πyes, Πno) with
the aid of a computationally-unbounded untrusted prover P who tries to convince V that
x is a yes-instance. Towards this end, the two parties exchange messages via a protocol,
and at the end the verifier decides whether to accept or to reject the input. The protocol
should achieve completeness and soundness. The former asserts that yes-instances should
be accepted except for some small probability (completeness error), and the latter asserts
that no-instances should be rejected regardless of the prover’s strategy except for some small
probability (soundness error). (See Definition 10.)
The celebrated result of [30, 37] shows that interactive proofs are as strong as polynomial-
space computations (i.e., IP = PSPACE). Moreover, randomness seems essential for this
result: If one limits the verifier to be deterministic then interaction does not really help –
the prover can predict the verifier messages and so can send all the answers at once – and
the power of such proof systems is limited to NP. Put differently, randomness provides
“unpredictability” which is crucial for achieving soundness, i.e., for coping with a cheating
prover. In fact, even in cases where soundness can be achieved deterministically (i.e., when
the underlying problem is in NP) one may want to use a randomized proof system. This
is the case, for example, when the prover wants to hide some information from the verifier
like in the case of zero-knowledge proofs [24]. Indeed, deterministic proof systems inherently
allow the verifier to convince others in the validity of the statement, a property that violates
zero-knowledge for non-trivial languages [34]. In this context, randomness is used for hiding
information similarly to its use in the setting of randomized encryption [23].
How much randomness is needed for interactive proofs?
We would like to understand how randomness complexity scales with other resources. Spe-
cifically, we would like to relate it to the communication complexity of the protocol – a
measure that was extensively studied in the context of interactive proofs and for which we
have better understanding (e.g., [18, 21]). We therefore ask:
Given an interactive proof system ⟨P, V ⟩ for a problem Π, can we always sparsify
the randomness complexity R to be comparable with the amount of communication
complexity? Can we do this while preserving zero-knowledge?
We use the term randomness sparsification to highlight the point that we do not aim for full
de-randomization, rather we only try to make sure that the randomness complexity is not
much larger than the communication complexity.
1.1 Related works
Clearly the question of sparsification becomes trivial for public-coin protocols (aka Arthur-
Merlin protocols) in which all the randomness of the verifier is being sent during the
protocol. Goldwasser and Sipser [25] showed that any general interactive proof protocol
1 A promise problem [13] is a partition of the set of all strings into three sets: Πyes the set of yes instances,
Πno the set of no instances, and {0, 1}∗ \ (Πyes ∪ Πno) the set of “disallowed strings”. The more common
notion of a language corresponds to the special case where Πno is the complement of Πyes (i.e., there
are no disallowed strings). The promise problem formalization is especially adequate for the study of
interactive proofs and is therefore adopted for this paper. See [17] for a thorough discussion.
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can be transformed into public-coin protocol, however, this transformation increases the
randomness complexity of the new system and therefore does not resolve the sparsification
question.
Information-theoretically, if the verifier sends at most CV bits during the whole interaction,
it should be possible to emulate it with about CV bits of randomness (in expectation).
Indeed, in the context of two-party communication complexity games, it is well known [31]
that randomized protocols that use R random bits can be converted into protocols whose
randomness complexity is not much larger than the communication complexity C. While
this result can be generalized to the setting of interactive proof systems [2], it does not
preserve the computational complexity of the verifier. Specifically, this sparsification is
essentially based on an inefficient pseudorandom generator G whose existence follows from
the probabilistic method.
The question of efficient sparsification in the related context of information-theoretic
secure multiparty computation (ITMPC) was addressed by Ishai and Dubrov [12]. They
introduced the notion of non-Boolean PRG (nb-PRG) and showed that such a PRG can be
used to sparsify efficiently-computable protocols with passive security.2 The definition of
nb-PRG generalizes the standard notion of PRG by considering non-Boolean distinguishers.
Formally, a (T, C, ε) nb-PRG G : {0, 1}S → {0, 1}R fools any T -time non-Boolean algorithm
D : {0, 1}R → {0, 1}C with C output bits in the sense that D(UR) is ε-close (in statistical
distance) to D(G(US)) where UN denotes the uniform distribution over N -bit strings. For
polynomially related parameters, nb-PRGs with an optimal seed length of O(C) bits can be
obtained either based on (exponentially strong) cryptographic assumptions [12] or based on
standard worst-case complexity-theoretic assumptions [3, 1]. In order to sparsify a passively-
secure efficient ITMPC protocol, it suffices to invoke the parties over pseudorandom tapes
that are selected according to (T, C, ε) nb-PRG where C upper-bounds the number of bits
communicated to the adversary and T is the total computational complexity of the protocol.
The main idea is to note that any fixed coalition of corrupted parties receives from the
honest parties at most C bits of incoming messages whose distribution can be generated by
applying a procedure D to the pseudorandom tapes of the honest parties. The procedure D
is obtained by “gluing” together the codes of all parties, and can therefore be implemented
with complexity T . Since the underlying nb-PRG fools D, the sparsified protocol remains
information-theoretic private: An external unbounded environment that examines the view
of the adversary “learns” nothing on the honest parties inputs.
The above argument relies on the efficiency of all internal parties that participate in
the protocol. It is therefore unclear whether it can be extended it to our setting where
prover, even when played honestly, may be computationally unbounded.3 Nuida and
Hanaoka [33] pointed out to the limitation of the nb-PRG approach in the context of “leaky”
distinguishing games with an internal computationally-unbounded adversary, and suggested
to use exponentially-strong cryptographic pseudorandom generators (whose distinguishing
advantage is exponential in the leakage available to the adversary). It should be mentioned,
however, that although the original sparsification argument of [12] fails, we do not know
2 More precisely, their sparsification applies to protocols with privacy against parties that passively follow
the protocol but may select their random tape arbitrarily. (In addition, they used an indistinguishability-
based definition which is equivalent to unbounded simulation, however, their result seems to generalize
to the case of efficient simulation as well.)
3 In contrast, one can use nb-PRGs (against arbitrary polynomial-time adversaries) to sparsify efficiently-
computable argument systems. In such systems correctness holds with respect to an efficient prover
strategy, and soundness is required to hold only against efficient provers. However, this setting has no
information-theoretic flavor and a standard cryptographic pseudorandom generator can be used as well.
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whether nb-PRGs suffice for sparsification neither in our context nor in the more general
context suggested by [33]. In fact, known concrete constructions of nb-PRGs (e.g., ones that
are based on exponential cryptographic-PRGs) seem to suffice for this purpose.
Finally, let us mention that several works have studied other aspects of randomness
complexity in the context of public-coin interactive proof systems. This includes randomness-
efficient methods for round-reduction [7] and for error-reduction [6].
1.2 Our Results and Techniques
In this paper, we present several sparsification results for interactive proofs and for zero-
knowledge proofs. We begin with the former case.
1.2.1 General Interactive Proofs
Before stating our results, we set-up some notation.
▶ Notation 1. For polynomially-bounded integer-valued functions R, CV , TV , CP and k we
consider proof systems that on an n-bit input, the parties exchange k(n) messages, where
the verifier V uses R(n) random bits, sends a total number of CV (n) bits, and runs in time
TV (n), and the prover sends a total number of CP (n) bits. We refer to such protocols as
IPk[R, CV , TV , CP ] protocols. We also consider non-uniform IPk[R, CV , TV , CP ] protocols
in which the verifier is implemented by a TV -size circuit. We sometimes omit k and use
IP[R, CV , TV , CP ] (or non-uniform IP[R, CV , TV , CP ]) to denote a protocol with an unspecified
round complexity. (Observe that in any case k is upper-bounded by CV + CP .) Similarly,
we let IP (resp.,IP/poly, IPk) denote the union of IP[R, CV , TV , CP ] (resp., non-uniform
IP[R, CV , TV , CP ], IPk[R, CV , TV , CP ]) where R, CV , TV , CP range over all polynomially-
bounded functions.
1.2.1.1 PRGs against interactive proofs
Let us begin by presenting a natural definition for a PRG against an interactive proof.
Consider an IP[R, CV , TV , CP ] proof system ⟨P, V ⟩ for a problem Π with completeness error
of δc and soundness error of δs. For a length-extending function G : {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n)
we define the verifier V G(x) to be the verifier that samples a seed s←↩ {0, 1}S(n) and invokes





forms an interactive proof system for Π with an additive penalty of ε in the
completeness and soundness error, i.e., the completeness error and soundness errors are
upper-bounded by δc + ε and by δs + ε, respectively.
We begin by noting that, in the non-uniform setting, one can construct such PRGs
unconditionally with a seed length that is linear in the verifier’s communication complexity
and logarithmic in its running time.
▶ Theorem 2. For every functions TV (n), CV (n), CP (n), R(n) : N→ N and ϵ : N→ [0, 1],
there exists a G : {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n) that can be computed by a non-uniform Õ(RTV )-size
circuit and ε-fools every non-uniform IP[R, CV , TV , CP ] protocol where S = 2CV +2 log(1/ε)+
log TV + log log TV + O(1).
As an immediate corollary we derive the following result.
▶ Theorem 3 (Non-Uniform Randomness Sparsification for IP). Suppose that a promise
problem Π has a (possibly non-uniform) IP[R, CV , TV , CP ] interactive proof ⟨P, V ⟩ with
completeness error δc and soundness error δs. Then, for every ε(n), the promise problem Π
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also has a non-uniform proof system ⟨P, V ′⟩ whose verifier is a non-uniform algorithm with
randomness complexity R′ = O(CV + log(1/ε) + log TV ) and computational complexity of
T ′V = TV + Õ(TV (R + log(1/ε))) and with identical communication complexity (C ′V = CV
and C ′P = CP ), and identical round complexity. The soundness and completeness error of
the new system are δ′s ⩽ δs + ε and δ′c ⩽ δc + ε. Moreover, if the original proof system has a
prefect completeness then so is the new system.4
The PRG construction (Theorem 2) is based on a family of t-wise independent hash
functions. That is, we show that, for a properly chosen parameter t, a randomly chosen t-wise
independent hash function is likely to fool IP[R, CV , TV , CP ]. Unfortunately, one has to invest
too many random bits in order to sample a hash function, and so we use non-uniformity to
hard-wire one “good” hash function. (See Section 3 for details.) An alternative solution is to
select the hash function via a common-random-string (CRS) that is available to both parties
and can be reused among many invocations.5 This also leads to uniform sparsification in an
amortized setting where many instances are considered together. In such a case one can even
remove the CRS and let the verifier sample it once for all the instances. (See Corollary 19.)
1.2.1.2 Single-Instance Sparsification in the uniform setting without CRS?
A natural way for achieving randomness sparsification in the uniform setting is to “sparsify”
the process of selecting the hash function. That is, to use a different pseudorandom generator
to sample a hash function. Indeed, this approach was taken by [1] to construct nb-PRGs.
The idea is to show that given the description of a hash function hz one can determine
with “not-too-large-complexity” (e.g., low in the polynomial hierarchy) whether hz fools an
interactive proof system. If such a decision can be made by some “algorithm” D then we can
select the hash function by using a PRG that fools D. Unfortunately, our definition of “fooling
interactive proofs” does not seem to be efficiently-decidable. First, the definition implicitly
refers to inputs that satisfy the promise of the underlying problem Π, and deciding whether
an input x belongs to Πyes ∪Πno may be very hard. Second, as part of the pseudorandomness




should preserve completeness (up to an error of ε).
However, this property depends on the behavior of the honest prover P which is an inefficient
procedure on which we have no “handle”. In particular, even if we try to design an interactive
proof system for deciding whether hz is a good PRG, it is not clear how to make sure that
the unbounded prover really uses the honest P when needed.
1.2.1.3 Strong PRGs
We solve both problems by strengthening the notion of pseudorandomness against interactive
proofs. Specifically, we say that G strongly ε-fools the protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ if for every string
x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and every possible prover strategy P ∗, the gap between the acceptance probability
of V (x) when interacting with P ∗(x) and the acceptance probability of V G(x) when interacting
with P ∗(x) is at most ε. While this definition seems stronger than the previous one, the
proof of Theorem 2 actually shows that random hash functions strongly fool interactive
proofs. Crucially, this new definition makes no reference to the underlying promise problem
or to the honest prover P . (Indeed, one may say that G ε-fools the interactive machine V .)
4 All our transformations preserve perfect completeness. From now on, we omit this point throughout
this section.
5 In many scenarios such a CRS is available “for free”. Furthermore, the fact that it is re-usable and that
it should not be kept private from the prover even before the protocol begins, makes it highly-attractive
even compared to public coins.
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As a result, the above-mentioned obstacles are removed and we can show that the problem
of checking whether a given hash function hz strongly-fools an IPk proof system admits an
IPk+1 proof system. For constant k, this puts the language of “bad” hash functions in the
class AM and so we can select our hash function by a pseudorandom generator that fools
AM – a well-studied object in complexity theory. Specifically, known constructions of such
PRGs [32, 27, 28, 36] can be based on the assumption that E = DTime(2O(n)) is hard for
exponential size non-deterministic circuits. (See Theorem 22 for details). In Section 4 we
prove the following result.
▶ Theorem 4 (Uniform Randomness Sparsification for constant-round proofs). Suppose that
E is hard for exponential size non-deterministic circuits. Then, for every inverse polyno-
mial ε, every constant k and every polynomially-bounded functions R, CV , TV , CP , there
exists a PRG computable in uniform polynomial time of T ′V = Õ(TV · (R + log n)) that
strongly ε-fools non-uniform IPk[R, CV , TV , CP ] proof systems with seed length of R′ =
2CV + O(log n). Consequently, every IPk[R, CV , TV , CP ] proof system can be transformed
into a new IPk[R′, CV , T ′V , CP ] with an additive penalty of ε in the soundness and completeness
errors. Moreover, perfect completeness is preserved.
The underlying assumption can be viewed as a natural extension of EXP ≠ NP to the
non-uniform settings. Similar assumptions were made in the literature (e.g., [5, 11, 14, 22, 39]).
▶ Remark 5. One should note that when k is constant the underlying assumption suffices
for full de-randomization of the protocol (via a sequence of transformations). Still, one
may prefer to use the sparsified protocol (that still uses some randomness), either due
to its efficiency properties (in terms of computation and communication) or due to its
zero-knowledge properties as discussed in Section 1.2.2.
The seed length of our PRGs is dominated by the number of bits, CV , sent by the verifier.
(This is the case both in the uniform and non-uniform settings.) It is not hard to show that
such a dependency is essentially optimal even if one considers the weaker variant of IP PRGs.
▶ Proposition 6 (Sparsification lower-bound). For every functions TV (n), CV (n), CP (n), R(n) :
N → N where CV < R every G : {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n) that 0.1-fools IP[R, CV , TV , CP ]
protocols must have a seed length of Ω(CV ).
Proof. Assume that S < αCV for some small constant α < 1. A simple information-theoretic
argument shows that y = G(US) is predicatable in the following sense. There exists an index
i ∈ [CV ] such that given the (i−1)-prefix y[1 : i−1], one can guess (possibly inefficiently) the
next bit y[i] with success probability of, say, 0.8. Indeed, letting pi := H(yi|y[1 : i−1]) denote
the conditional entropy of yi given the prefix, we know that
∑CV
i=1 pi ⩽ H(y) = S < αCV and
so, by an averaging argument, there exists an index i for which pi < α. For sufficiently small
constant α, this implies that yi is predictable with probability 0.8. Consider the following
proof system for the trivial empty language (Πyes = ∅ and Πno = {0, 1}∗). The verifier
samples r ∈ {0, 1}R and sends r[1 : i − 1] to the prover who responds with a single bit b.
The verifier accepts if b = y[i]. When r is random the soundness error is 1/2, but when
r = G(US), the error grows to 0.8. ◀
1.2.1.4 nb-PRGs are not IP-PRGs
We also show (in the full version) that, under plausible cryptographic assumptions, some
nb-PRGs do not fool IP protocols. Roughly, this is done by constructing a nb-PRG which is
malleable. That is, although the prover cannot tell whether the verifier uses random bits
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or bits that were generated via the nb-PRG, she can provide a short hint that allows a
computationally-bounded algorithm (the original verifier) to distinguish between the two
cases. Our results therefore show that the inapplicability of nb-PRGs to our setting reflects
an inherent limitation and it is not just an artifact of the previous proof techniques.
1.2.2 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We move on and study randomness-sparsification for statistical zero-knowledge proofs. In
the following we focus on constant-round zero-knowledge protocols with a uniform verifier
and base our results on the assumption from Theorem 4. If one is willing to make the verifier
non-uniform (or to allow a public common reference string), then the following results can
be proved unconditionally without assumptions for protocols with an arbitrary number of
rounds.
Let SZKk[R, CV , TV , CP ] be an IPk[R, CV , TV , CP ] statistical zero-knowledge protocol,
whose zero-knowledge property holds against an arbitrary, possibly malicious, verifier that
may deviate from the protocol. We begin by noting that PRG-based randomness-sparsification
trivially preserves such a strong zero knowledge property.
▶ Theorem 7 (Uniform Randomness Sparsification for constant-round SZK). Suppose that E
is hard for exponential size non-deterministic circuits. Then, for every inverse polynomial
ε, every constant-round SZKk[R, CV , TV , CP ] proof system can be transformed into a new
SZKk[R′, CV , T ′V , CP ] with randomness of R′ = 2CV + O(log n), (uniform) verifier’s com-
plexity of T ′V = Õ(TV · (R + log n)) and with an additive penalty of ε in the soundness and
completeness errors.
The proof is straightforward: Any malicious verifier strategy that can be played in the





is a feature of the honest prover that remains unchanged in the sparsified proof system.
1.2.2.1 Sparsifying HVSZK?
We move on and ask whether such a theorem can be proved for the case of honest-verifier
statistical zero-knowledge protocols (HVSZK). While there are known transformations from
HVSZK to SZK (e.g., [40, 20, 26]) these transformations incur a communication complexity
overhead that is at least as large as the randomness complexity of the original protocol.
Therefore, the problem of sparsifying HVSZK is not known to be reducible to the sparsification
of SZK.
It is instructive to see why Theorem 7 does not immediately generalize to the HVSZK
setting. Consider for simplicity a 2-message proof system ⟨P, V ⟩ where V sends a message a
and receives a message b. The view of an honest verifier consists of the input x, the random




, the view consists of
the input x, a PRG seed s and the message a. Suppose that the original verifier admits a
simulator that, given x, samples the pair (r, a). How can we use such a simulator to sample
(s, a)? If we use the original simulator then a random r is unlikely to land in the image
of G which is sparse in the set of all R-bit strings. Moreover, even if we hit the image,
it is not clear how to invert G and find an appropriate seed. We observe that the second
problem can be easily solved by exploiting the concrete structure of our PRGs. Specifically,
by using algebraic constructions of t-wise independent hash functions we can efficiently invert
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the PRGs in polynomial-time.6 To handle the sparsity problem we suggest two possible
approaches:
Our first solution exploits the prover. We show that the simulation problem can be
avoided by asking the prover to supply R random bits at the beginning of the interaction.
In the context of honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge proofs, we show that randomness
can be traded by a simulation slow-down. Specifically, the sparsified protocol (without
any modifications) can be simulated with an overhead of time 2R−S where S is the
seed-length of the generator. (See Corollary 37.) Such a simulation implies witness-
indistinguishability [15] and can be meaningful when the underlying problem is harder
than 2R−S . Specifically, one can tune S, i.e., the level of sparsification, according to the
hardness of the problem.
1.2.2.2 How much should we pay?
In the above solutions we pay a communication overhead of R (resp., simulation slow-down
of 2R−S) in the sparsification of HVSZK systems (resp., HVPZK) whereas in the case of SZK
proof systems (with security against cheating verifier) we pay nothing. It turns out that one
can interpolate between these two extremes based on a single measure. Roughly, we say that
a proof system is an F -semi-malicious statistical zero-knowledge system (F -SMSZK), for
some function 0 < F < R if it is possible to simulate every verifier that plays honestly except
that it selects the first F -bits of its random tape by some arbitrary (efficiently-computable)
distribution (the other R− F coins are chosen uniformly).7 We prove the following theorem.
(See Corollaries 30 and 33.)
▶ Theorem 8 (Trading randomness with prover’s communication or simulation slowdown).
Suppose that E is hard for exponential size non-deterministic circuits. Then, every promise
problem Π that admits a constant-round F -SMSZKk[R, CV , CP , TV ] proof system ⟨P, V ⟩ also
has:
An HVSZKk+1[R′ = 2CV + O(log n), CV , T ′V = Õ(TV · (R + log n)), C ′P = CP + R − F ]
proof system. Specifically, the new protocol consists of an additional preliminary message
from the prover that consists of a random string of length R− F bits.
In the prefect zero-knowledge setting, where ⟨P, V ⟩ is F -SMPZKk[R, CV , CP , TV ] sys-
tem, the problem Π admits an HVPZKk[2CV + O(log n), CV , CP , TV ] proof system whose
simulator runs in time poly(n)2R−F .
Observe that 0 ⩽ F ⩽ R and that any HVSZK proof system is also an 0-SMSZK and every
SZK proof system is R-SMSZK. Thus Theorem 8 implies Theorem 7. Interestingly, some
classical HVSZK proof systems also achieve full accessibility of F = R. Most notably, this
is the case for the classical protocol for the complete statistical-distance problem of [35] as
well as the classical proof system for graph-non-isomorphism (GNI) of [19]. (See the full
version.) In fact, these proof systems have only two messages and therefore they are known
to be insecure against a cheating verifier [34, Theorem 8] (unless the underlying problems are
in BPP). It follows that even the notion of R-SMSZK proof systems is likely to be weaker
then SZK.
6 This does not contradict security since our PRG fools verifiers of predetermined fixed polynomial-time
(corresponding to the running time of the verifier) but can be inverted in larger polynomial time. This
feature of the fixed-polynomial-time setting (that is typically used in the context of derandomization [32])
seems novel to this work.
7 One should not be confused with our notion of semi-malicious SZK proof systems and the one suggested
by [29] that applies to zero-knowledge PCPs.
B. Applebaum and E. Golombek 4:9
We further mention that even when F = 0, we can get some non-trivial simulation for
HVPZK. Specifically by exploiting the concrete properties of our PRG we can get a simulator
whose complexity is poly(n)2R−S where R is the original randomness complexity and S is
the seed length of the simulator. (See Section 5.5.) As an application, one can adjust the seed
length (i.e., the level of sparsification) according to a given time-bound on the simulation
(that may be dictated by the intractability of the underlying language).
1.2.2.3 Organization
Following some preliminaries (Section 2), we study, in Section 3, randomness sparsification
for interactive proofs in the non-uniform setting and in the amortized sparsification in the
uniform setting. Section 4 is devoted to randomness sparsification for constant-round uniform
interactive proofs, and Section 5 to statistical zero-knowledge proofs.
2 Preliminaries
Probabilistic notation
For every n ∈ N we denote by Un the uniform distribution over the set {0, 1}n of binary
strings of length n. For a probability distribution D, we use the notation x←↩ D to denote a
value x that is sampled according to D. When D is a finite set, the notation x←↩ D denotes
a value x that is sampled uniformly from D. We follow the standard way of defining distance
between two distributions:
▶ Definition 9 (Statistical Distance). Given X, Y two probability distributions over some
discrete universe Ω the statistical difference between them is defined:
SD(X, Y ) = maxS⊂Ω|Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]|.
▶ Definition 10 (Interactive proof system [24]). A pair of interactive machines ⟨P, V ⟩ is
called an interactive proof system with completeness error of δc and soundness error of δs
for a promise problem Π = (Πyes, Πno) if the followings hold:
Completeness: For every x ∈ Πyes we have
Pr[(P, V )(x) = 1] ⩾ 1− δc(|x|)
where the probability is taken over the randomness of V and P and we write (P, V )(x) = 1
to denote the event that, after interacting with P (x), the verifier V (x) accepts.
Soundness: For any cheating strategy for the prover P ∗ and every x ∈ Πno, it holds that
Pr[(P ∗, V )(x) = 1] ⩽ δs(|x|).
When the parameters δc and δs are unspecified we assume that they are taken to be o(1).8 By
default, we assume that V is efficient, i.e., it runs in time TV (|x|) for some polynomially-
bounded function TV . In the non-uniform setting, we assume that V can be implemented by
a non-uniform family of TV (|x|)-size probabilistic circuits.
8 Standard ρ-fold parallel repetition reduces the errors exponentially with ρ at the expense of increasing
the communication and computation complexity by a factor of ρ and without affecting the round
complexity (see e.g., [16]).
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Following Notation 1, we let k, R, CV , CP denote the number of messages sent in the protocol,
the randomness complexity of V , the number of bits sent by V , and the number of bits sent
by P .
▶ Definition 11 (Statistical Zero-Knowledge). An interactive proof system ⟨P, V ⟩ for a promise
problem Π = (Πyes, Πno) is a Statistical Zero-Knowledge proof system (SZK) with a simulation
error of δz if for every computationally-unbounded verifier V ∗ there exists a simulator Sim
that runs in time polynomial in the complexity of V ∗ such that for every yes-instance x ∈ Πyes
it holds that
SD(viewV ∗(x), Sim(x)) ⩽ δz(|x|),
where viewV ∗(x) is the random variable that corresponds to the view of V ∗(x) when interacting
with P (x) which consists of the random tape and all the incoming messages that were sent
by P .
The proof system is an Honest-Verifier Statistical Zero-Knowledge proof system (HVSZK)
if the above holds for the special case where V ∗ = V . We also denote by HVSZK and SZK
the class of all promise problems that posses such an interactive proof system (with error
parameters of o(1)).
3 Non-uniform randomness sparsification for IP
In this section we study the possibility of reducing the randomness of a general proof system
(P, V ). We begin by defining a strong form of pseudo-random generators against interactive
proof systems.
▶ Definition 12 (Strongly fooling a protocol). Let ⟨P, V ⟩ be a protocol and R(n) denote the
randomness complexity of V . For a length-extending function G : {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n) we
define the verifier V G(x) to be the verifier that samples a seed s←↩ {0, 1}S(n) and invokes
V (x; r) with randomness r = G(s).
We say that G strongly ε-fools the protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ if for every input x and any possible
prover strategy P ∗ it holds that
|Pr[(V, P ∗)(x) = 1]− Pr[(V G, P ∗)(x) = 1]| ⩽ ε.
We say that G strongly ε-fools IP[R, CV , TV , CP ] if it strongly ε-fools any interactive proof
⟨P, V ⟩ ∈ IP[R, CV , TV , CP ].
Recall that is the class IP[R, CV , TV , CP ] is the class of IP protocols in which on an n-bit
input the verifier runs in TV (n) time, uses at most R(n) random bits and sends at most
CV (n) bits to the prover, and the total length of the prover responds is at most CP (n) bits.
Observe that a PRG strongly fools a protocol regardless of the prescribed prover, and it is a
trait of the verifier.
▶ Observation 13. Suppose that ⟨P, V ⟩ is an interactive proof system for a promise problem
Π with completeness error δc and soundness error δs and G strongly ε-fools ⟨P, V ⟩. Then〈
P, V G
〉
is an interactive proof system for a promise problem Π with completeness error
δc + ε and soundness error δs + ε. Moreover, if the original system has perfect completeness
then so is the new system.
Proof. The first part is immediate from Definition 12. The “Moreover” part holds for any G




for which (V G, P )(x)
rejects translate into a random tape r = G(s) for which (V, P )(x) rejects as well. ◀
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We continue by showing that pseudo-random generators against circuits with very small
error can be used to fool protocols.
▶ Lemma 14 (Fooling protocols via circuit-PRGs). Let TV (n), CV (n), CP (n), R(n) : N→ N be
some integer-valued functions and let ϵ : N→ [0, 1]. Every PRG G : {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n)
that ε/2CV (n)-fools 3TV -size circuits also strongly ε-fools non-uniform IP[R, CV , TV , CP ]
protocols.
Proof. Let ⟨P, V ⟩ be some (possibly non-uniform) IP[R, CV , TV , CP ] proof system and let
G : {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n) be a PRG that ε/2CV (n)-fools 3TV -size circuits. Fix some input
x ∈ {0, 1}n and let CV = CV (n), TV = TV (n), CP = CP (n) and S = S(n). Fix some proof
strategy P ∗. Let viewV (r) denote the verifier’s view when interacting with P ∗ on the shared
input x with randomness r. This view consists of (x, r), the concatenation, a⃗ of all the
messages sent from V to P ∗ during the interaction and the messages b⃗ that were sent from
P ∗ to V during the interaction.9 In the following, we will think of (⃗a, b⃗) as random variables
whose distribution is induced by a random choice of the verifier’s random coins.
We will show that (*) viewV (Ur) is ε indistinguishable from viewV (G(US)) by TV -size
circuits. Note that (*) implies that |Pr[(V, P ∗)(x) = 1] − Pr[(V G, P ∗)(x) = 1]| ⩽ ϵ since
V decides whether to accept its view by applying a predicate which is computable by a
circuit of size at most TV . Let us assume, without loss of generality, that the strategy P ∗ is
deterministic. Indeed, if (*) does not hold for some randomized P ∗ then, by an averaging
argument, there exists a deterministic P ∗ that violates (*).
We proceed by proving (*). Assume towards contradiction that there exists some






















∣∣∣∣ Prr←↩UR[D(x, r, a⃗, b⃗) = 1 | a⃗ = a] Prr←↩UR [⃗a = a]
− Pr
r←↩G(US)




where the inequality is due to the triangle inequality. By an averaging argument, we conclude
that there should be at least one element a∗ such that
ε
2CV <
∣∣∣∣ Prr←↩UR[D(x, r, a⃗, b⃗) = 1 | a⃗ = a∗] Prr←↩UR [⃗a = a∗]
− Pr
r←↩G(US)




Recall that the prover is deterministic and therefore once the verifier’s messages are fixed
to a∗, the prover’s messages become fixed as well to some value b∗. We now can define a
new distinguisher D′ : {0, 1}R(n) → {0, 1} that holds (x, a∗, b∗) as a non-uniform advice
9 In the context of this proof, we omit the seed s from the verifier’s view. While such an omission will be
problematic later when discussing zero-knowledge, it has no consequences in the current proof.
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and operates as follows. Given an input r ∈ {0, 1}R(n), the distinguisher D′ invokes the
verifier V (x) using r as the random coins, and emulates the prover P ∗ by responding
according to b∗. If the resulting transcript disagrees with (a∗, b∗) the distinguisher D′
rejects. Otherwise, D′ return D(x, r, a∗, b∗). Clearly, D′ distinguishes between r ←↩ UR to
r ←↩ G(US) with advantage ε/2CV . Moreover, D′ can be implemented by a circuit of size
TV +(CV +CP )+TV ⩽ 3TV , and therefore we derive a contradiction to the pseudorandomness
of G and (*) follows. ◀
The following claim from [1] shows that good circuit PRGs can be obtained from t-wise
independent hash functions. In the following we say that a family of functions H = {hz :
X → Y } is t-wise independent [10] if for every t distinct inputs x1, . . . , xt ∈ X and uniformly
chosen hz ←↩ H, the random variable (hz(x1), . . . , hz(xt)) is uniformly distributed over Y t.
▷ Claim 15 (PRGs from hash functions (Claim 5.2 in [1])). For every T and ε, δ ∈ [0, 1],
and every family H = {hz : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}r} of t-wise independent hash functions with
t = 4T log T + 2 log(1/δ) and s = 2 log(1/ε) + log t the following holds. With probability
1− δ, a random member hz ←↩ H ε-fools any T -size circuit.
By combining Claim 15 with Lemma 14 we derive the following theorem.
▶ Theorem 16 (Fooling protocols via hashing). Let TV (n), CV (n), CP (n), R(n) : N → N
and ϵ, δ : N→ [0, 1] be some arbitrary functions and let H =
{
hz : {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n)
}
be a family of t-wise independent hash functions where t = O(TV log TV + log(1/δ)) and
S = 2CV + 2 log(1/ε) + log TV + log log TV + log log(1/δ) + O(1).
Then, Prhz←↩H[hz strongly ε-fools non-uniform IP[R, CV , TV , CP ]] > 1− δ.
▶ Remark 17 (Canonical construction of t-wise independent hash functions). Throughout the
paper we use the following standard construction of t-wise independent hash functions
H =
{
hz : {0, 1}S → {0, 1}R
}
where t < 2S < 2R. Let F = GF (2R) denote the finite field of
2R elements. We identify field elements with binary strings of length R via some canonical
representation that supports arithmetic operations with a computational cost of Õ(R) bit
operations (For instance [38]). It is well known [10] that the family H′ = {h′z : F→ F}z∈Ft
where h′z denotes the degree-t univariate polynomial whose coefficients are given by the
vector z ∈ Ft is a family of t-wise independent hash functions from {0, 1}R to {0, 1}R. We
define H by restricting the domain of H to some fixed 2S subset. Specifically, Let hz denote
the function that takes an input x ∈ {0, 1}S , maps it to F by padding it with R− S zeroes,
and outputs h′z(x). Then, H = {hz}z∈Ft is a t-wise independent family. Observe that one
can sample an index z by sampling a tR random bits, and that given z and x ∈ {0, 1}S we
can evaluate hz(x) by making O(t) arithmetic operations. Hence the total bit complexity of
sampling and evaluating a function in H is Õ(tR).
By hard-wiring a “good” hash function as a non-uniform advice to Theorem 16 we derive
the following corollary (that strengthens Theorem 2 from the introduction.).
▶ Corollary 18. For every functions TV (n), CV (n), CP (n), R(n) : N→ N and ϵ : N→ [0, 1],
there exists a PRG : {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n) that can be computed by a non-uniform Õ(RTV )-
time and strongly ε-fools non-uniform IP[R, CV , TV , CP ] where S = 2CV +2 log(1/ε)+log TV +
log log TV + O(1).
Theorem 3 follows immediately.
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The amortized setting
For a promise problem Π = (Πyes, Πno) and a polynomial k(·) define the problem Πk =
(Π′yes, Π′no) by letting Π′yes denote the set of all tuples x⃗ = (x1, . . . , xk(n)) ∈ ({0, 1}n)k(n) such
that xi ∈ Πyes for every i and by letting Π′no denote the set of tuples x⃗ = (x1, . . . , xk(n)) ∈
({0, 1}n)k(n) such that, for every i, xi ∈ Πyes ∪Πno and for at least one i, xi ∈ Πno.
▶ Corollary 19 (Uniform Amortized sparsafication of many instances). Let Π be a promise
problem that admits a uniform IP[R, CV , TV , CP ] proof system with negligible soundness
and correctness errors. Then, for every polynomial k(·), the promise problem Πk admits
a (uniform) IP[R′, C ′V = kCV , T ′V , C ′P = kCP ] proof system with constant error where
R′ = R · Õ(TV ) + O(k(CV + log k + log TV )) and T ′V = kÕ(TV R).
So for sufficiently large k, the amortized randomness complexity R′/k is O(CV +log k+log TV )
per instance.
Proof. Let ε = 1/(10k) and δ = 0.1. Let H be a family of t-wise hash function that expand
S bits to R bits where t = O(TV log TV ) and S = 2CV + 2 log(1/ε) + log TV + log log TV +
log log(1/δ)+O(1) ⩽ 2CV +2 log k+2 log TV +O(1). The verifier samples a function hz ←↩ H
and given x⃗ = (x1, . . . , xk(n)) applies, for each i, the original verifier V (xi; hz(si)) where si
is chosen uniformly and independently from US . At the end, we accept if and only if all
interactions accepted. The prover simply runs the original protocol k times.
By Theorem 16, with probability 1− δ the hash function hz ε-fools the original protocol.
Therefore, conditioned on this event, the error in each instance is at most ε + n−ω(1), and
by a union bound the total error is at most δ + kε + kn−ω(1) ⩽ 0.2, as required. The
communication grows by a factor of k, the randomness complexity is O(tR) for sampling the
hash function (Remark 17) plus O(kS) for sampling the seeds. The computational complexity
for sampling hz is Õ(tR) and each instance has an additional cost of TV + Õ(tR) (again see
Remark 17). ◀
4 Uniform Randomness Sparsification for Constant-Round Protocols
In this section we extend the randomness reduction seen in the previous section from the
non-uniform setting to the uniform setting. Recall that in the previous section we reduced the
randomness of general IP proofs by using a non-uniform advice that consisted of a description
of a “good” hash function that can be used as a PRG. As explained in Section 1.2 we cannot
afford to to sample the hash function uniformly since this requires too much randomness
(larger than the amount of randomness that is needed for the original protocol). Instead, we
describe a randomness-efficient method for sampling a “good” hash function via a uniform
algorithm by reducing the problem to a more standard de-randomization problem. We
further show that for constant number of rounds, the latter problem can be solved under
standard complexity-theoretic assumptions.
We begin by defining a promise problem whose no-instances corresponds to hash functions
that “fool a given protocol” and its “yes” instances are hash functions that “fail to fool the
protocol”.
▶ Definition 20. Let ⟨P, V ⟩ be a k-round (possibly non-uniform) IP[R, CV , CP , TV ] protocol
for a promise problem L with a polynomial-time verifier, and let ε(n) be some inverse
polynomial. Fix some efficiently computable family of hash functions
H =
{
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that satisfies Theorem 16 with respect to IP[R, CV , CP , TV ] protocols where the underlying
parameters ε, δ are taken both to be ε(n). We define a promise problem Π = ΠP,V,ε over
strings z ∈ {0, 1}∗ as follows:
The set of yes instances, Πyes, consists of all strings z such that hz does not strongly
2ε-fools ⟨P, V ⟩.
The set of no instances, Πno, consists of all strings z such that hz strongly ε-fools ⟨P, V ⟩.
We prove the following lemma.
▶ Lemma 21 (ΠP,V,ε ∈ IPk+1). For any k-message protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ (resp., non-uniform
protocol ⟨P, V ⟩) and inverse polynomial ε the promise problem ΠP,V,ε is in IPk+1 (resp.,
IP/polyk+1) and the computational complexity of the corresponding verifier is O(TV + TH)
where TV is the complexity of V and TH is the computational complexity of universal
evaluation of H. Consequently, for constant k, ΠP,V,ε is in AM (resp., in AM/poly).
Proof. On a shared input z ∈ {0, 1}∗, the prover will try to convince the verifier that hz
does not strongly 2ε-fools ⟨P, V ⟩. Recall that this means that one of the following holds for
some input x:
(Case 0:) There exists P ∗ Strategy such that Pr[(V hz , P ∗)(x) = 1] − Pr[(V, P ∗)(x) =
1] > 2ε.
(Case 1:) There exists P ∗ Strategy such that Pr[(V, P ∗)(x) = 1] − Pr[(V hz , P ∗)(x) =
1] > 2ε.
Accordingly, the prover first declares x and whether case (0) or case (1) holds and then
proceeds to prove its claim via an interactive proof. Specifically, on common input (1n, z)
the parties invoke the following (k + 1)-move protocol.
1. The prover finds an input x ∈ {0, 1}n and a proof strategy P ∗ such that Case c ∈ {0, 1}
holds.
The prover sends x and c.
2. The verifier samples two strings, r0 ←↩ UR, r1 ←↩ hz(US) and a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
The two parties invoke an interactive protocol where the prover plays P ∗(x) and the
verifier plays V (x; rb).
Let v ∈ {0, 1} denote the output (acceptance bit) of V (x; rb).
3. The verifier accepts if b = v ⊕ c.
Completeness: Assume that hz does not strongly 2ε-fool ⟨P, V ⟩ and let us assume that




∗, V hz )(x) = 1] + 12(1− Pr[(P
∗, V )(x) = 1]) ⩾ 12 + ε.
Soundness: Fix some no instance z for which hz strongly ε-fool ⟨P, V ⟩. We analyze the
acceptance probability of the verifier when interacting with a cheating prover. Fix an
arbitrary first message (x, c) of the prover and let us denote by P ∗ the strategy that the
prover plays in Step 2 of the protocol. Since hz strongly ε-fool ⟨P, V ⟩, it holds that the
difference between the quantities
q = Pr[(P ∗, V )(x) = 1] and qz = Pr[(P ∗, V hz )(x) = 1]
is at most ε in absolute value. Suppose that c = 0 (the other case is symmetric). Then, the




2(1− q) ⩽ 1/2 + ε/2,
B. Applebaum and E. Golombek 4:15
as required.
Overall, the protocol has completeness of 1/2 + ε and soundness of 1/2 + ε/2. Since
ε = Ω(1/poly(n)), we can use standard parallel amplification theorems to reduce the error
(cf. [16, Appendix A]). This completes the proof of the first part of the lemma. The
“Consequently” part, follows from the equivalence between constant-round IP protocols and
AM proofs [25, 4]. ◀
We will make use of the following result.
▶ Theorem 22 (PRGs against AM/poly [27, 28, 36]). Suppose that E = DTime(2O(n)) is hard
for exponential-size non-deterministic circuits10 , i.e., there exists a language L in E and a
constant β > 0, such that for every sufficiently large n, circuits of size 2βn fail to compute
the characteristic function of L on inputs of length n.
Then for every polynomial T (·) and inverse polynomial ε(·), there exists a pseudo-random
generator G that stretches seeds of length ρ = O(log m) into a string of length m in time
poly(m) such that G ε-fools every promise problem Π = (Πyes, Πno) that admits an AM/poly
proof system with a T -size verifier in the following sense. For every sufficiently large m and
b ∈ {yes, no}∣∣∣∣ Prz←↩Um[z ∈ Πb]− Prz←↩G(Uρ)[z ∈ Πb]
∣∣∣∣ ⩽ ε(m).
By combining the above theorem with Lemma 21, we derive the following corollary.
▶ Corollary 23 (uniform PRG against constant-round IP protocols). Under the assumption
of Theorem 22 for every polynomials TV (n), CV (n), CP (n), R(n) : N → N, constant k ∈ N
and inverse polynomial ε : N → [0, 1] there exists a polynomial-time computable PRG that
strongly ε-fools non-uniform IPk[R, CV , CP , TV ] with seed length of 2CV + O(log n).
Proof. Let ε′ = ε/4. Fix some non-uniform ⟨P, V ⟩ interactive proof in IPk[R, CV , CP , TV ]




hz : {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n)
}
z∈{0,1}Z(n)
is a family of t-wise independent hash functions where t = O(TV log TV + log(1/ε′)) and
S = 2CV + 2 log(1/ε′) + log TV + log log TV + log log(1/ε′) + O(1) that can be evaluated by
a poly(n)-time universal evaluation algorithm H : {0, 1}Z(n) × {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n). As
shown in Lemma 21, the promise problem Π is in AM/poly. Let us denote by T (n) the time
complexity of the verifier in the corresponding proof system (and recall that T = O(TV + TH)
and so it depends only on ε, R, CV , CP and TV ). Let G′ : {0, 1}ρ(n) → {0, 1}Z(n) be the PRG
that ε′-fools AM/poly problems with T -time verifiers as promised in Theorem 22. Recall that
ρ(n) = O(log Z(n)) = O(log n).
We define the PRG against non-uniform IPk[R, CV , CP , TV ] that maps a random seed of
length ρ(n)+S(n) into a pseudorandom string of length R(n) as follows. Given a seed (s1, s2)
where s1 ∈ {0, 1}ρ(n) and s2 ∈ {0, 1}S(n), output H(G′(s1), s2) = hG′(s1)(s2). Note that
PRG is indeed efficiently computable and that its definition depends only in the parameters
10 A non-deterministic circuit C has additional “non-deterministic input wires”. Such a circuit evaluates to
1 on x if and only if there exist an assignment to the non-deterministic input wires that makes C output
1 on x. Non-Deterministic circuits can be therefore viewed as a non-uniform version of the class NP.
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R, CV , CP , TV and ε. We prove that PRG strongly ε-fools ⟨P, V ⟩. For this it suffices to show
that, except with probability ε/2, over the choice of s1, it holds that hG′(s1)(s2) strongly
ε-fools ⟨P, V ⟩. Indeed,
Pr
s1
[G′(s1) ∈ Πno] ⩾ Pr
z
[z ∈ Πno]− ε′ ⩾ 1− 2ε′ ⩾ 1− ε/2
where the first inequality follows from the pseudo-randomness of G′ and the second inequality
follows from Theorem 16. The corollary follows. ◀
Theorem 4 follows immediately from Corollary 23
5 Zero Knowledge Proofs
In this section we study the problem of randomness sparsification for zero-knowledge proof
systems.
5.1 SZK proof systems
We begin by noting that PRG-based sparsification trivially preserves zero-knowledge against
malicious verifier.
▶ Observation 24. If ⟨P, V ⟩ is a constant-round SZK proof system and G ε-fools ⟨P, V ⟩ then〈
P, V G
〉
is an SZK proof system whose soundness error and completeness error increase by









is an interactive proof system with the desired
parameters. Since zero-knowledge against cheating verifier is a property of P the new system
is also zero-knowledge. ◀
By combining the above observation with Corollary 23 we derive Theorem 7.
5.2 Semi-Malicious SZK Proof Systems
We move on to study sparsification for semi-malicious SZK proof systems. We begin by
introducing this new variant of zero-knowledge.
▶ Definition 25 (F semi-malicious SZK). Let F : N→ N be an integer valued function and
let ⟨P, V ⟩ be a proof system with randomness complexity of R for a promise problem Π. Let
D(1n; s) be an efficiently-computable algorithm that given randomness s outputs F (n) bits.
Define the verifier VD(x) as follows:
Sample random coins s for D, and compute the F (|x|)-bit string f = D(1|x|, s).
Sample r′ ←↩ {0, 1}R(|x|)−F (|x|).
invoke V (x) on the concatenated random tape f ◦ r′.
Let µ(D) denote the completeness error of the proof system ⟨P, VD⟩ with respect to Π, and
let viewVD (x) denote the random variable that corresponds to the view of the verifier VD(x)
when interacting with P on a common input x.
We say that ⟨P, V ⟩ is F semi-malicious zero-knowledge proof system with zero-knowledge
error of δz, abbreviated (F, δz)-SMSZK, if for every efficiently-computable algorithm D(1n; s)
there exists a simulator SimD that runs in expected polynomial-time such that for every yes
instance x,
SD(SimD(x), viewVD (x)) ⩽ δz + µ(D). (1)
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By default, we assume that δz is negligible and in this case we refer ⟨P, V ⟩ as F -SMSZK proof
system. The notion of F semi-malicious perfect zero-knowledge proof system (F -SMPZK is
short) is defined analogously, except that the simulator’s deviation in (1) must be zero. We
refer to the F -bit prefix of the verifier’s tape as the accessible bits.
▶ Remark 26 (On the additive term µ(D)). One could consider a more restrictive definition
of F -SMSZK in which the deviation of the simulator SimD is bounded by δz regardless of
the completeness error µ(D) of D. While our reductions are compatible with this alternative
variant as well, we choose to employ the current definition since it is more liberal. Further
note that the additive term µ(D) intuitively allows the simulator to deviate when the protocol
outputs non-accepting transcripts. Thus, one can roughly think of our definition as restricting
the attention to semi-malicious distributions D that put most of their mass on strategies for
which completeness hold.
Observe that 0 ⩽ F ⩽ R and that any HVSZK proof system is also an 0-SMSZK and
every SZK proof system is R-SMSZK. On the other hand, as mentioned in Section 1.2.2, the
classical HVSZK proof system for the complete statistical-distance problem of [35] can be
shown to have maximal accessible bit complexity of F = R too. (See the full version.) Thus,
even R− SMSZK complexity is a weaker notion than SZK complexity.
▶ Remark 27. One can use a more general definition in which the “accessible bits” are
not necessarily the first ones and can be taken to be any set of F (|x|) indices that can be
efficiently computable and possibly depend on the input x itself. However, in this case one
can always modify the verifier (by pre-permuting the random tape) and make sure that the
accessible bits are located in the first F (|x|) indices.
▶ Remark 28. Typical SMSZK systems (e.g., for statistical-distance [35] or for GNI [19])
satisfy the following stronger definition. There exists a “universal” simulator Sim such that
for every yes instance x and every fixing f ∈ {0, 1}F (|x|) of the first F (|x|) bits of the verifier,
the distribution Sim(x, f) is (δz + µ(f))-close, in statistical-distance, to the view of Vf when
interacting with P on the input x, where Vf denotes the verifier that given an input x and a
random tape r′ ←↩ {0, 1}R(|x|)−F (|x|) invokes V (x) on the concatenated random tape f ◦ r′.
5.3 SMSZK: Randomness vs. Prover’s Communication/CRS
▶ Theorem 29. Let ⟨P, V ⟩ be an (F, δz)-SMSZKk[R, CV , CP , TV ] proof system for the promise
problem Π. Suppose that G : {0, 1}S → {0, 1}R ε-fools non-uniform IP[R, CV , CP , TV ]
protocols. Consider the following proof system ⟨P ′, V ′⟩ that on shared input x of length n
proceeds as follows:
1. P ′ sends a random message a of length R− F where R = R(n) and F = F (n).
2. The verifier reads his random tape s ←↩ US(n), computes r2 = G(s), expands a to an
R-bit string r1 = 0F ◦ a and sets r = r1 ⊕ r2. From now on, the prover plays P (x) and
verifier plays V (x; r).
Then, ⟨P ′, V ′⟩ is an HVSZKk+1 proof system with zero-knowledge error of δz + ε and an ε
additive penalty in the correctness and soundness error.
Proof. We begin by showing that ⟨P ′, V ′⟩ is an IPk+1 proof system for Π. For any fixing
of a ∈ {0, 1}R−F , define the proof system ⟨Pa, Va⟩ in which the verifier expands a to r1
like in the above description, samples r2 uniformly and calls V (x; r1 ⊕ r2) and the prover
operates as before. Clearly, the soundness and correctness of this system is the same as
the original one. Next, define the a-residual proof system ⟨P ′a, V ′a⟩ which is identical to the
sparsified system ⟨P ′, V ′⟩ except that a is hard-coded into V ′ who skips the first step of the
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above protocol. The proof system ⟨P ′a, V ′a⟩ is the G-sparsified version of ⟨Pa, Va⟩, and since
G ε-fools non-uniform proof systems, the system ⟨P ′a, V ′a⟩ is sound and complete (with an
additive error of ε). Since this is true for every choice of a, it follows that ⟨P ′, V ′⟩ is an
IPk+1 proof system for Π.
Let D(1n; s) be the algorithm that samples s←↩ US(n) and outputs the F (n)-bit prefix
of G(s), and let SimD denote the simulator of the original F -SMSZKk[R, CV , CP , TV ] proof
system with respect to the distribution D(1n). We define a simulator Sim′ for ⟨P ′, V ′⟩ that,
on an input x of length n, operates as follows:
1. Let S = S(n), R = R(n) and F = F (n). Invoke SimD(x) and sample a view (x, s′, α, c′)
where s′ is the S-bit seed sampled for D, α ∈ {0, 1}R−F form the uniform part of the
verifier’s random tape, and c′ is the (simulated) sequence of incoming messages.
2. Compute r′2 = G(s) and set a′ ∈ {0, 1}R−F to be the XOR of α with the (R − F )-bit
suffix of r′2.
3. Output the tuple (x, s′, a′, c′).
Fix a yes instance x. We analyze the statistical distance between the simulated tuple
(x, s′, a′, c′) and the “real” tuple (x, s, a, c) that corresponds to the distribution of the real
view of V ′ when interacting with P . It suffices to show that if the original simulator is
perfect the two distributions are identical. (Indeed, since the new simulator makes a single
call to the original simulator, a deviation of δz + ε of the original simulator can increase the
statistical distance of the new one by at most δz + ε.)
First observe that in both experiments s and s′ are distributed uniformly. Fix some value
for s = s′, and consider the conditional distributions [(a′, c′)|s′] and [(a, c)|s]. Next observe
that a is uniform and that a′ is uniform as well (since α is uniform). Finally, conditioned on
(s, a) = (s′, a′) the transcript c is sampled according to the experiment ⟨P, V ⟩ (x; r) where
r = (0F ◦ a) ⊕ G(s) and similarly the simulated transcript c′ is sampled according to the
experiment ⟨P, V ⟩ (x; r′) where r′ = (0F ◦ a′)⊕G(s′) = (G(s′)[1 : F ] ◦ α) and so the tuples
are identically distributed. ◀
By combining Theorem 29 with Corollary 23 we derive the following corollary which
implies the first part of Theorem 8 from the introduction.
▶ Corollary 30 (Trading randomness with prover’s communication for SMSZK). Suppose that E
is hard for exponential size non-deterministic circuits. Then, for every inverse polynomial ε,
every constant-round (F, δz)-SMSZKk[R, CV , CP , TV ] proof system can be transformed into a
new
HVSZKk+1[R′ = 2CV + O(log n), CV , T ′V = Õ(TV · (R + log n)), C ′P = CP + R− F ]
system with an additive penalty of ε in the soundness and completeness error and an additive
penalty of ε+δz in the simulation error. Specifically, the new protocol consists of an additional
preliminary message from the prover that consists of a random string of length R− F bits.
Moreover, the transformation preserves perfect completeness, and if the original proof system
is semi-malicious perfect zero-knowledge then the resulting scheme admits a perfect simulation
(i.e., it is HVPZKk+1[R′, CV , T ′V , C ′P ]).
▶ Remark 31. Corollary 30 can be converted to a statement regarding HVSZK in the common
reference string model by replacing the first message of the prover with a common reference
string ρ. This CRS can be chosen by the prover (a malicious choice does not affect the
soundness). However, the CRS is not reusable among several invocations.
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5.4 SMPZK: Randomness vs. Simulation Complexity
In the perfect setting, SMPZK proof systems can be sparsified at the expense of slowing-down
the simulation by a factor of 2R−F .
▶ Lemma 32. Let ⟨P, V ⟩ be an F -SMPZK proof system for a promise problem Π. Let





is a proof system with an additive penalty of ε in soundness and
completeness errors that has a perfect honest-verifier simulator Sim′ with expected running-
time of (poly(n))2R(n)−F (n).
Proof. Let D(1n; s) be the algorithm that samples s ←↩ US(n) and outputs the F (n)-bit
prefix of G(s), and let SimD denote the simulator of the original F -SMPZK proof system with
respect to the distribution D(1n). The view of V D in interaction with P over a yes-instance
x ∈ {0, 1}n is parsed into (x, s, β, c) where s←↩ US(n), β ←↩ UR(n)−F (n) and c is the vector of
incoming messages. We define a new simulator Sim′(x) as follows: (1) Sample (x; s′, β′, c′) by
invoking SimD(x) (2) If the last R(n)− F (n) bits of G(s′) equal to β′ output the transcript
(x; s′, β′, c′) and halt; otherwise, goto (1).
Since β′ is uniformly distributed, at each iteration Sim′ halts with probability 2F (n)−R(n),
and so the expected running time is poly(n)2R(n)−F (n). Perfect simulation follows by noting
that (s′, β′) are distributed identically to the random tape of V G and that conditioned on
every fixing of these coins, (s, β), the simulated transcript c′ is distributed just like a real
interaction between P (x) and V G(x; s, β) (since SimD is a perfect simulator). ◀
By combining Lemma 32 with Corollary 23 we derive the following corollary which implies
the second part of Theorem 8 from the introduction.
▶ Corollary 33. Assuming that E is hard for exponential size non-deterministic circuits,
let ε : N → [0, 1] be an inverse polynomial and R, CV , CP , TV : N → N be polynomially
bounded functions where Cv = ω(log n). Suppose that the promise problem Π admits a
constant-round F -SMPZKk[R, CV , CP , TV ] proof system. Then Π admits an IPk[R′ = 2CV +
O(log n), CV , CP , TV ] proof system with an honest-verifier perfect simulator that runs in
expected time of poly(n)2R−F and with ε penalty in the soundness and completeness errors.
5.5 HVPZK: Randomness vs. Simulation Complexity
Corollary 33 shows that F -SMPZK systems can be sparsified with a simulation slow-down of
2R−F . In this section we describe a different simulation strategy that yields a slow-down of
2R−S where S is the seed-length of the PRG. This holds even when F = 0, i.e., for HVPZK
proof systems. This theorem is based on a PRG that satisfies some additional features (e.g.,
regularity and the existence of an efficient inversion algorithm). We later show that our
PRGs meet these requirements.
▶ Definition 34. We say that a function G : {0, 1}S → {0, 1}R is δ-regular if G(US) is δ-
close in statistical distance to U(Image(G)), the uniform over the image of G. (In particular,
a 0-regular function maps the same number of inputs to each of its outputs.) A uniform
inversion algorithm for G is a randomized algorithm that given an input y ∈ {0, 1}R outputs
⊥ if y is not in the image of G, and, otherwise, outputs a uniformly chosen preimage of y
under G.
▶ Lemma 35. Let ⟨P, V ⟩ be an HVPZK proof system for a promise problem Π whose simulator
Sim runs in time TSim. Let G : {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n) be a poly(n)-time computable function
that ε-fools ⟨P, V ⟩, can be uniformly inverted in expected time of TG−1 , and is δ-regular.
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is a proof system with an additive penalty of ε in soundness and
completeness errors and with an honest-verifier simulator Sim′ with statistical deviation of δ
and expected running-time of (TSim + TG−1) 2
R
|Image(G)| .
Proof. For a given instance x, the view of the original verifier V can be parsed to (x, r, v)
where r is the randomness and v is the transcript. Let us parse the view of V G (in an
interaction (P, V G)(x)) as a tuple (x, s, r, v) where s is the seed r = G(s) and v is the
transcript v. (While r is redundant it will be useful to keep it as part of the view.) The
simulator Sim′(x) does the following: (1) Sample (r′, v′) by calling Sim(x); (2) Call the
G-inverter on r′ and denote its output by s′. If the output is ⊥ output ⊥; otherwise, output
the tuple (x, s′, r′, v′).
Let us analyze the statistical deviation of Sim′. Fix some yes instance x and consider
the distribution (x, s, r, v) in the real interaction (P, V G)(x). Observe that, conditioned
on r = r′ the simulated tuple (x, s′, r′, v′) is distributed identically to the real distribution
(x, s, r, v). Indeed, in both cases s is uniform preimage of r and v is a random transcript
that corresponds to an interaction between P (x) and V (x; G(s)). Therefore, the statistical
distance between the simulated view (conditioned on not outputting ⊥) and the real view is
exactly the statistical distance between r = G(US) and r′ = U(Image(G)) which is at most
δ since G is δ-regular. Finally, observe that the success probability (that r′ hits Image(G))
is exactly |Image(G)|/2R, and so the expected number of iterations is 2R/|Image(G)| as
required. ◀
We move on and show that our PRGs are invertable and almost-uniform.
▶ Proposition 36. Let k ∈ N be a constant, R, CV , CP , TV : N→ N polynomially-bounded
functions and ε : N → [0, 1] be an inverse polynomial. Let G : {0, 1}S(n) → {0, 1}R(n) be
the uniform PRG (resp., non-uniform PRG) that ε-fools non-uniform IPk[R, CV , CP , TV ]
(resp., non-uniform IP[R, CV , CP , TV ]) that is promised by Corollary 23 (resp., Corollary 18).
Then G is (poly(n)2−S(n))-regular, the image of G, on n-bit inputs, consists of at least
2S(n)/poly(n) strings and there is an algorithm that, given the description of G, uniformly
inverts G in expected poly(n) time.
Proof. We begin with the non-uniform version of G (from Corollary 18). As explained
in Remark 17, G is defined by some degree-t univariate polynomial hz : F → F over the
field F = GF (2R) and t = poly(n). To compute G on an input x ∈ {0, 1}S , we map x to
a field element (by padding with R − S zeroes) and output the evaluation of hz on the
padded-version of x.
Let y be a string in the image of G. First observe that the number of preimages
under G is at most t since the polynomial hz,y = hz(x) − y is of degree t = poly(n).
Hence, |Image(G)| ⩾ 2S/poly(n) and G(US) samples every element y ∈ Image(G) with
probability py ∈ [1/|Image(G)|, t/|Image(G)|]. Since U(Image(G)) samples each element from
Image(G) with weight 1/|Image(G)|, it follows that G is δ regular for δ = O(t/|Image(G)|) =
poly(n)/2S(n).
Next, observe that there exists a randomized algorithm A that given y lists in expected
time of TA = poly(t, R) = poly(n) all the pre-images of y under G. (This can be done, for
example, by factoring hz,y to its irreducible components via the algorithm of [9] and by
noting that, for each root a of hz,y, the polynomial x− a must appear in the factorization.)
We can therefore sample a random preimage in expected-polynomial time.
We move on to the uniform setting. Recall that in this setting (Corollary 23), the PRG
G is defined as follows: (1) Sample a short seed s1 of length O(log n) and a long seed s2 of
length S −O(log n); (2) Feed the short seed s1 into a PRG G1 that fools AM/poly languages
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(with properly chosen parameters) and use the resulting string z = G1(s1) to select a degree-t
univariate polynomial hz : F→ F over the field F = GF (2R) where t = poly(n) as before; (3)
Output hz(s2).
It follows that each point in the image of G has at most t · |Image(G1)| ⩽ poly(n)
preimages. Therefore, |Image(G)| ⩾ 2S(n)/poly(n) and G is δ-regular for δ = O(poly(n)/2S).
Finally, in order to uniformly invert y ∈ Image(G) we compute, for every s1, the list Ls1 ={
(s1, s2) : hG1(s1)(s2) = y
}
(using the aforementioned algorithm for hz where z = G1(s1)),
and then sample a preimage (s1, s2) uniformly from the union of all these (polynomially-many)
lists. The expected running time is O(2|s1|poly(n)) = poly(n), as required. ◀
By combining Lemma 35 and Proposition 36, we derive the following corollary.
▶ Corollary 37. Assuming that E is hard for exponential size non-deterministic circuits,
let ε : N → [0, 1] be an inverse polynomial and R, CV , CP , TV : N → N be polynomially
bounded functions where Cv = ω(log n). Suppose that the promise problem Π admits a
constant-round HVPZKk[R, CV , CP , TV ] proof system. Then Π admits an IPk[R′ = 2CV +
O(log n), CV , CP , TV ] proof system with an honest-verifier simulator with negligible deviation
error and expected running time of poly(n)2R−S.
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